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Thursday, January 08, 2009
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Asteve
Activist
 Posts:930
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| 17/07/2007 10:59 AM |
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I think it is time to fork – leaving “Money as Debt” to
discuss the potential consequences to money in general from Fractional Reserve
Banking. In this thread, I’d like to
concentrate on the forms of securitised debt that back the UK’s mortgage
markets; the nature of risk in the relevant corporate bonds and regulatory
issues which have lead to the easy availability of high risk, low cost mortgages. The first helpful article I’ve found is this: http://www.financialpolicy.org/fpfprimermbs.htm
Unfortunately, it relates to the American market – though, I
still found it very enlightening. I’d
love to find something equivalent that relates to the UK market. |
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SquatNow
Activist
 Posts:504
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| 17/07/2007 3:06 PM |
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Essentially the problem with FRB is that the banks arn't keeping a big enough reserve.
It wont take many missed payment (as a percentage of payments overall) fo the banks to find themselves in financial trouble.
In fact I'de stake my shirt that if 25% of people with a bank loan missed a payment at the same time, the banks would have to default on thier loans and would collapse. |
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SquatNow - Web site now ready! www.squatnow.com Promoting Social Squatting |
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bankenstein
Activist
 Posts:105
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| 18/07/2007 2:42 AM |
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Poor old Joe Public is forced to take on more debt than he can handle just to live in a half decent house.
His mortgage account is packaged and sold by the lending bank to Joe's pension fund in exchange for Joe's hard earned pension contributions.
Interest rates are raised, Joe defaults on his mortgage repayments and loses his house. His house has dropped in value since he bought it and he is now homeless but, because of negative equity, he is still in debt.
Because it is now stuffed with high risk CDOs whose market values have plummeted, Joe's pension fund is worth only a fraction of what he paid in. The pension that it can buy for Joe is tiny, less even than his enforced debt repayments.
Joe is completely impoverished and he is a slave of the financial system. He has lost his house and his pension and he has to work under the government's "Dignity Through Work" program until he dies. He lives in a dingy council refuge for the dispossessed.
His bank has the cash that Joe paid into his pension fund. His pension fund manager has moved on to another well-paid job misinvesting other people's money for fat commissions. His house was snapped up for peanuts at the repossession auction by a wealthy BTL landlord.
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SquatNow
Activist
 Posts:504
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| 18/07/2007 3:10 AM |
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"His bank has the cash that Joe paid into his pension fund. His pension fund manager has moved on to another well-paid job misinvesting other people's money for fat commissions. His house was snapped up for peanuts at the repossession auction by a wealthy BTL landlord."
Close... the money he paid into his pension fund actually end up in the hands of the person he bought his house from.
Essentially all the money ends up in the hands of the land speculators, who then use it to come in after the crash and buy up all the houses for peanuts, before repeating the cycle. |
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SquatNow - Web site now ready! www.squatnow.com Promoting Social Squatting |
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Asteve
Activist
 Posts:930
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| 18/07/2007 6:23 AM |
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I almost agree with Squatter, I'd say, however, that the money ultimately ends up in the hands of land speculators and those whom the land speculators need to keep sweet in order to have value added to their investment by the allocation of planning permission.
This is exactly the problem that will prevent Brown's expanded house building scheme from success... the wrangling over which land speculator will get the planning permission will, in my opinion, make private build targets by 2020 extremely unlikely... and, probably, be won not by the land owner with the most suitable plots - but by the land-owner with the cheapest plots who greases the most palms. If Brown is serious about building, he can't stop at MOD land - he needs to acquire land held by speculators... The only way I can see for him to do that would be for the government to acquire the land without issuing planning permission (it has a strong position to negotiate here as compulsory purchase is an option) - then auctioning the right to build on it (meeting targets) - where failure to meet targets results in a forfeiture of the freehold rights from the builder back to the government (who are then free to sell them on again on a similar basis.) This way, any increased value from planning permission benefits the public purse rather than the private pockets of speculators. This would allow tax cuts and/or increases in spending on essential services - such as health & other key workers' remuneration.
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SquatNow
Activist
 Posts:504
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| 18/07/2007 9:48 AM |
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Or just Tax Land.
If you tax all land at a percentage of it's value, then suitable empty building land will attract a HUGE tax. The land speculator will have 2 choices... sell the land ASAP or pay a huge amount of tax. The problem at the moment is the land speculator can own that land without it costing him any money. Thus he can just sit on it until someone makes him a humungus offer.
If you tax that lan he can't just sit there while it goes up in value... since as it increases in value so does his tax bill!
The added advantage of this is that only landowners would need to pay tax... so no VAT, PAYE, NI, HRT, CGT, IHT, RFL, IPT, CT etc etc giving a huge saving in red tape and attracting businesses to the UK.
Noticed all the new blocks of flats popping up in town centers....? The speculators recently sold up. All at the same time. For a whopping great big profit.
The house price crash is arriving now. The speculators sold up before the crash, about 8 months ago, and that very act of selling up and dumping a huge amount of land on the market is part of what is kicking off the crash. As hundreds of thousands of new BTL flats hit the market it's caused massive oversupply and collapsed rents. All the BTL loonies who have been ramping up the market for the last 5 years are about to lose their shirts, and everyone else is about to lose their pensions. |
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SquatNow - Web site now ready! www.squatnow.com Promoting Social Squatting |
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bankenstein
Activist
 Posts:105
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| 19/07/2007 4:51 AM |
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The continuing story of poor Joe Public …
Joe finds out that the pension fund management company that screwed up his pension is in fact a subsidiary of the bank which sold Joe’s mortgage to it.
Within the same financial umbrella group, Joe’s pension fund contributions were moved from where Joe might benefit from them (in his pension pot) to where he could not. The risk that Joe might default on his mortgage, as later he did, was moved from the lending bank over to Joe’s pension pot.
Joe finds out that the BTL landlord who bought his house at the repossession auction is also a director of the bank. The auctioneer tells Joe how impressively well-informed the BTL landlord always appears to be when he attends the auctions.
Joe’s council refuge is privatised and is bought cheaply from the council by a company partly owned by the very same BTL landlord. The company is called “Security and Comfort for Senior Citizens Plc”. Joe discovers that the BTL landlord is also a local authority councillor.
Joe’s only son, 40 years old, is now required by law to take out a government loan to subsidise Joe’s increased rent. This is done under the government’s new “Inter-generational Responsibility and Social Fairness” scheme.
Joe tops himself. |
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Asteve
Activist
 Posts:930
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| 19/07/2007 6:50 AM |
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With reverence to the fictitious troubles of Joe, can we get back to Securitized Debt?
This is from Jean-Claude Trichet (European Central Bank President):
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aRz8N0Ms_g0A
Interesting points: * "Credit derivatives are the fastest growing financial market." * "The amount of outstanding credit derivatives contracts has increased 33 percent from $26 trillion in June and from $17 trillion a year ago, ISDA said." * "Much of the demand for credit-default swaps last year came from banks, hedge funds and other asset managers that pooled the contracts into collateralized debt obligations, securities that use the income from default swaps to pay investors."
N.B. ISDA => International Swaps and Derivatives Association
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Credit_default_swap
OK, so, can someone find a flaw in this plan:
1. Buy a property with a very high level of leverage - say a 100% mortgage (keeping hold of the deposit, ignoring the high interest payments.) 2. Buy a *lot* of CDS securities "Over The Counter" - use all available funds. 3. Fail to make a payment - triggering a CDS "event" 4. Receive large sums from CDS securities - pay backdated interest on loan. 5. Repeat as often as you can get away with it.
Do CDS credit derivatives provide feedback within the credit market - with the ultimate effect of dramatically increasing risk?
Is this an insurance fraud on an international scale that isn't an insurance fraud in law because CDS are not insurance, they just work like insurance?
Should we really be looking at the CDS markets rather than at the CDO markets to establish the real risks? Is CDS risk mitigated with a new even more exotic transaction?
Are commercial banks playing a very clever game - watching current accounts, and controlling short term loans and overdrafts, banks can predict when customers will default. If banks can predict this (but no-one else can, except the mortgage holder) I wonder if banks intend to profit by speculation on the CDS markets?
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bankenstein
Activist
 Posts:105
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| 27/07/2007 3:33 AM |
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Does it occur to anyone else how amazingly profitable CDOs are for the initial lenders?
Suppose that a bank issues a mortgage of say £100K, co-creating both the £100K lent to the mortgagee and the £100K loan account to be repaid with interest over time.
It then sells the loan account to some pension fund or investment trust, say for £110K, as part of a package of similar debt wrapped up as a CDO. We suppose that it’s a high quality, low risk loan and that the good price reflects this.
The bank now has £110K, almost all pure profit, made very quickly from doing almost nothing! The money is free and clear, the risk of default has been offloaded with the sale of the loan.
I am astounded that such incredibly lucrative paper shuffling is legal. It is, almost literally, a pure profit making enterprise. Hard working career criminals must be green with envy.
In the words of Gershwin - nice work if you can get it. |
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Asteve
Activist
 Posts:930
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| 27/07/2007 4:08 AM |
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If the average resale price for a CDO is £110K for £100k loan, then I have to point out that the profit is £10K, not £110K. Not to be sniffed at, but not quite as profitable as you first suggested.
While I don't know for sure, I doubt that they work like this. I think that the CDO will be sold for very close to the amount of the loan, and (I think) the bank remains involved in the context of collecting the interest payments... I expect skimming a margin for its trouble, and passing on the rest to the pension fund... all risk free activity for the bank.
This isn't the really clever bit. The really clever bit is in statifying the debt - so that there are some very risky and some almost risk free CDOs. This leads to some very interesting advantages to those who can trust which corporate bonds can be trusted and which are essentially worthless. Armed with this information, one would be able to make staggering profits by borrowing secured against the CDO (in a low interest market such as Japan or Europe) - and buying more CDOs.
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bankenstein
Activist
 Posts:105
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| 27/07/2007 4:50 AM |
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My point is precisely that the whole £110K is profit. It is literally money in the bank which did not cost the bank any of its own pre-existent money to obtain. There was no outlay of £100K by the bank to conduct this business.
Michael Rowbotham explains in The Grip of Death (written before CDOs were prevalent) how debt repayments to the lending bank annihilate the debt but are not themselves co-annihilated. The returning money remains on the books of the bank as an asset. Even more of an outrage than I first understood.
CDOs are a way for the bank to realize this asset pronto and to offload the risk of default at the same time. The craziness and danger of private banks legally creating money is now made even more obvious with CDOs. Most people however still do not see it. We will pay for our ignorance and blindness with our pensions and investments. |
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Asteve
Activist
 Posts:930
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| 27/07/2007 9:56 AM |
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Bankenstein: "My point is precisely that the whole £110K is profit. It is literally money in the bank which did not cost the bank any of its own pre-existent money to obtain. There was no outlay of £100K by the bank to conduct this business."
In this claim, you are wrong:
1. The money was already in the bank - in the account of whomever bought the CDO. £110K would disappear from the account of the CDO buyer; £100K would be deposited into the account of the solicitor handling the purchase; £10K would go into the bank's own account from which bank employees are paid. 2. If £100K was not deposited into the account of the solicitor, there would be no CDO to sell, because there would be no debt - hence it definitely costs the bank £100K to issue a £100K loan.
I remain to be convinced that securitized debt (initially) sells at a premium... can we prove this one-way or the other? I'd expect that the bank takes a skim from each interest payment... say 1%, at a guess. Of course, there is no reason that the bank can't sell the CDO at a premium, but this would make it less attractive - and, likely, would require a higher return as an inducement for someone to pay the premium up-front.
To claim that the whole sum is "profit", by any stretch of the definition of that word, you'd have to convince me that the CDO was 'bought' by the bank itself... but that tactic would not be without risk. If a significant number of mortgage holders default on their loan and declare themselves bankrupt, the bad debts would need to be reflected on the balance sheet. This would adversely affect share price, and might risk the institution's credit rating - and that golden-goose is too profitable to be risked unnecessarily.
If I were running a bank, what I'd like to do is to take the maximum profit I can while taking negligible risk. As a broad rule of thumb, I might choose to lend as much from fractional reserve as the deposit (providing this doesn't exceed 40% of the asking price of the property) and for, say, 1000 mortgages I issue, where, say, 20% is loaned through fractional reserve banking, define that my loan must be repaid before the CDO is paid out. This means that the bank will be paid in full unless 80% of people default... which is probably a risk I'd find acceptable to the bank. The CDO could then take the elevated risk while the bank plays it safe. I wouldn't want to loan all the mortgage money, or to lay-off some of the risk on individual mortgages - as, that way, if someone is declared bankrupt, the bank suffers a loss. The right proportion to loan through FRB amounts to a complicated issue of risk - an issue I expect that the banks have thought through very, very carefully... With such low fractional reserves, a run on a bank could easily have devastating consequences... causing share prices to tumble and city bonuses to disappear... I expect that there are international speculators who would seriously consider exploiting a weakness in a bank in order to launch a takeover bid on the cheap.
So... the most relevant question that we can ask here is "What proportion of mortgage lending is financed using CDOs sold outside the bank?" We can guess that this proportion is fairly high, but hard and fast figures would be very helpful. We need to know how risk is apportioned between different kinds of bond, and then we need to establish what, if any, bonds are held by banks themselves.
The bonds held by banks generate the maximum profit - but they also attract the maximum risk. I expect all the banks will behave similarly as, if they didn't, one of them would be vulnerable to takeover on account of a plummeting share price... so, an advantage to us is that if we can establish how one bank behaves, we can extrapolate from that to understand the whole market. By establishing the exact mechanism by which risk is apportioned to the corporate bonds issued by banks, we might well be able to establish the extent to which the housing market is actually over valued.
Of course, if we establish that the vast majority of CDOs are purchased on funds acquired through the narrowing of fractional reserve, or that CDOs account for only a small proportion of mortgage lending, I will agree that the banks are acting recklessly - but, before we go there, can we find out who owns these CDOs; for what proportion of mortgage debt they cover - and, critically, under what exact default situation do CDOs fail to pay out?
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Asteve
Activist
 Posts:930
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| 27/07/2007 10:42 AM |
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Asteve
Activist
 Posts:930
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| 27/07/2007 10:42 AM |
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Here's an interesting article about US securitized debt. It makes an interesting prediction - i.e. that banks, unable to offload risky debt from their books, will become dramatically more risk adverse...
If investors over-react and refuse to buy securitized debt, we're in for a very interesting situation.
http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article1657.html |
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bankenstein
Activist
 Posts:105
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| 27/07/2007 11:28 AM |
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Asteve, are we at crossed purposes?
I am imagining two distinct events, separated by an interval of time, possibly a short interval:
First, the bank makes a loan. As we both know, the money which is lent to the borrower and the corresponding loan account are co-created by the bank from nothing. The borrower has £100K and the bank has a loan account which (let us say) should receive £8K per year from the borrower for the next 25 years. This loan account has a market value. Whoever owns it has an income stream.
Later the loan account, now up and running, is packaged up in a CDO. This package is then sold, maybe for more than £100K, maybe for less. The buyer of the CDO is (let us say) a pension fund. The bank receives payment for the sale of the CDO and ownership of the loan, and therefore of the income stream, changes hands. The bank now has a lump sum of money that it didn’t have before. This money comes from wherever the pension fund was keeping it before buying the CDO with it. It certainly does not have to be “already in the bank”.
The lump sum of money now held by the bank is, less expenses, all profit.
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SquatNow
Activist
 Posts:504
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Asteve
Activist
 Posts:930
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| 27/07/2007 11:52 AM |
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Bankenstein: “Asteve, are we at crossed purposes?”
No, you’re just ignoring the blatantly obvious. When a mortgage is issued, it is paid to someone who is selling a house. This is not a bank - as most banks don't own or build a lot of residential property. This is where the bulk of the money acquired by issuing CDOs go. Well, actually, according to the article in marketoracle.co.uk, the money goes back into bank reserves as banks appear to finance mortgages in the short term on their own recognisance – only later selling the debt in order to clear risk from their balance sheet… because risk on a balance sheet is bad for the bank’s reputation and, hence, share price.
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Asteve
Activist
 Posts:930
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| 27/07/2007 11:57 AM |
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I want to know who owns the CDOs. If they are owned, for example, by foreign entities, shouldn't they be included in the national debt?
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bankenstein
Activist
 Posts:105
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| 27/07/2007 11:58 AM |
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SquatNow, may I suggest that you write to the following “loonies” and inform them of the error of their ways.
The Money Reform Party
Michael Rowbotham, author of The Grip of Death
Aaron Russo, director of Freedom to Fascism
Bill Still, director of The Money Masters
Paul Grignon, maker of the Money as Debt animation
John Tomlinson, author of Honest Money
Bill Bonner, author of Empire of Debt
Vincent R. LoCascio, author of The Monetary Elite vs Gold’s Honest Discipline
etc., etc., …
I thank you for giving me the opportunity to list these useful references and I hope that one day you will understand what they (and many others) are trying to tell us.
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Asteve
Activist
 Posts:930
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| 27/07/2007 12:15 PM |
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Bankenstein, what I think Squatter was trying to say is that your analysis of the situation is very flawed. Neither Squatter (AFAIK) nor I have a problem acknowleging that FRB is highly lucrative, and of dubious morality. We do have a problem with the repeated assertion that money is just created willy-nilly. Banks are just the brokers... even if brokering money is very lucrative... in the words of Mervin King, "Debt is real" - it is very important *never* to forget that. The extent to which debt can expand is directly related to both credit risk and the willingness of individuals to borrow. If borrowers refuse to borrow, or lenders loose on bad debts, or (shock horror, it could happen after significant wage inflation) repayments are funded by productivity... then debt decreases.
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