

THE PRICEDOUT MANIFESTO TOM SPENCER

PricedOut is the national campaign for affordable house prices. Founded in 2006 we have been fighting for an end to the housing crisis ever since. We believe that everyone deserves a safe, affordable, high quality home, something that is denied to far too many because of a chronic undersupply of homes.

For decades the UK has abjectly failed to deliver the homes we need. Prices and rents have sprialled as supply has not kept up with demand. The root cause of this is the planning system: a top-down, anti-development set of overlapping processes that set developer against resident, leading to vicious fights instead of win-win solutions.

This report by our research manager, Tom Spencer, sets out the scale of the crisis, and what can be done. Tom focuses on how the game can be changed to get residents and local councils on board with development, moving from our combative system to one that provides the homes we need with community support.

PricedOut is growing quickly and we have huge plans fore the future but we're a 100% volunteer campaign. If you want to get involved and support our work, please get in touch, volunteer and donate. Together we can end the housiing crisis.

Get in touch team@pricedout.org.uk

Donate pricedout.org.uk/donate

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Tom Spencer is the Research Manager of Priced Out. He has a Bachelors degree in Law and a Masters in Land Economy where he specialised in the law and economics of land use policy. As well as publishing papers for numerous think tanks, Tom has published peer reviewed work in the Journal of Planning & Environment Law and the Conveyancer and Property Lawyer among other places.





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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since the Second World War, England has failed to build enough homes to meet the needs of the population, thanks to the creation of a discretionary planning system that makes it inordinately difficult to build new homes. Consequently, house prices have soared, pricing out individuals and families from moving to the places that best meet their needs.

The economic solution to this is obvious: we need to build more homes. However, this has been known for decades. This solution has failed to work because campaigners have not managed to create a policy platform that addresses both the need for more housing and the potential consequences of development on neighbouring communities. This manifesto seeks to rectify this by focusing on both policies to make housing more popular with individuals, and policies to make it more popular with local authorities.

To make housing more popular with individuals, we recommend:

- 1. Trialling Community Land Auctions to allow the massive uplift in land value unlocked through planning reforms to be better captured by the community
- 2. Reforming leasehold tenure to encourage a shift towards commonhold developments in new units and greater protections for those in leasehold estates.
- 3. Introducing design codes agreed upon via Street Votes to provide a simplified route for delivering new housing that enhances the character of local areas.

Furthermore, to encourage local authorities to be more supportive of housing, we recommend:

- 1. Replacing Community Infrastructure Levies and Planning Obligations with a Development Tax.
- 2. Introducing a scheme similar to California's Builders' Remedy to encourage authorities to update their local plans.
- 3. Introducing low-income housing tax credits to allow authorities to benefit directly from building affordable rented accommodation.

In addition to these ideas we also recommend:

- 1. Abolishing council tax and stamp duty in favour of Fairer Share's proportional property tax.
- 2. Releasing greenbelt protections from land within walking distance of train stations.
- 3. Reintroducing legal aid for housing disputes for those unable to obtain independent legal advice.



NTRODUCTION

PricedOut was founded in 2006 in response to a rapid rise in house prices largely celebrated in the media. In 2003, the Guardian described reports of house price inflation slowing as gloomy and celebrated reports that prices rose 25% the previous year. Similarly, in 2006, the Financial Times celebrated a buoyant housing market with prices rising faster than ever, with many leading experts warning that slowing house price growth would be damaging to the economy.^{2,3}

Looking at the statistics, it is not surprising that people felt that house price growth was a good thing. Between 1979 and 2006, real house prices more than septupled.4 Moreover, between 1996 and 2006, real house prices grew twice as fast as incomes.⁵ This appeared to be beneficial to those already owning their own homes at a time when around 70% of all homes were owner-occupied. This meant that the vast majority of people would benefit, at least to some extent, from policies that increased housing prices.6

However, adopting policies that accelerated house prices ignored a growing undercurrent of people who were 'priced out' of the housing market and unable to access housing. In 2006, a third of all working households under 40 could not afford to buy a home, housing costs made up on average 25% of net household income for the poorest quintile of the population, 21.5 million people were living in overcrowded conditions and the use of temporary accommodation for homeless people had more than doubled in 1997. Amidst widespread celebration of increasing asset prices by asset owners, the rest of Britain was suffering under a housing crisis which very few people were talking about.

Even at the time, it was obvious that the principal cause of the nascent housing crisis was an inadequate supply of houses. As early as 1973, Peter Hall, a former President of the Town and Country Planning Association, had pointed out that containing urban development had resulted in higher land and ultimately house prices thanks to their increased scarcity.8 Later, Paul Cheshire and Stephen Shepherd found that the planning system's effects equated to a 3.9% income tax.9

The truth is the system of land use planning that has dominated the United Kingdom since 1947 has made it overly difficult to respond to growing demand for new homes. Although some of the details have changed, the general idea that all developments are subject to approval from the state has remained. This reality sets us apart from the

⁹Cheshire, P; Shepherd S (2002) The welfare economics of land use planning. Journal of Urban Economics, 52(2).



¹ https://www.theguardian.com/business/2003/feb/05/housingmarket.houseprices

² https://www.ft.com/content/13cd6192-38bb-11db-a21d-0000779e2340 ³ https://www.ft.com/content/6f2df4b8-fa3e-11da-b7ff-0000779e2340

https://www.nationwidehousepriceindex.co.uk/download/uk-house-prices-since-1952
Author's calculations based on the Nationwide House Price Index and ONS' Real Household Disposable Income statistics.

⁶ https://www.brookings.edu/essay/uk-rental-housing-markets/

⁷ https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/monitoring-housing-and-neighbourhoods-trends-2006 8 Peter Hall, The Containment of Urban England (Allen & Unwin 1973).

rest of the world who ordinarily boast rules-based regimes where individuals can easily navigate through regulations dictating what can and cannot exist. Although some development control is necessary in any country due to the negative externalities that development creates, the British planning system is designed in such a way that a shortage economy becomes inevitable.

In effect, planners, sitting at a local level, are allocated the goal of rationing land on a case-by-case basis. Since development often yields heavily dispersed benefits, as those who would move into the new homes often live outside a given ward, but heavily concentrated costs to those nearby, then local councils have an incentive to deny housing. This is worsened by our tax regime that does not sufficiently reward councils who permit more homes by increasing their tax revenue. Inevitably this results in a permanent shortage which results in an extremely inelastic supply of housing (e.g., an increase in prices does not result in increased supply thanks to planning restrictions). 11 This means that any increase in productivity will ultimately be capitalised into the price of assets as opposed to the pockets of workers. 12 The effects of this are massive - indeed, one paper estimated that had these planning controls been removed in 1974, then house prices in 2008 would have been £79,000 lower. More realistically, if the South East of England had permitted new homes at the same rate as the North East, then prices in 2008 would have been 25% lower. 13

Despite the hard work of multiple generations of activists, this reality has not changed. Since our founding in 2006, the housing crisis has only worsened. Average house prices in April 2023 sat at £287,506, almost 80% more than prices at the start of 2006.14 In contrast, incomes have only risen by an average of 2.9% annually over this period.¹⁵

The effects of this crisis on everyone's standards of living are astronomical. When prices are too high, we are less able to find a place of our own upon reaching adulthood. We also have to pay greater proportions of our incomes on housing expenses, limiting the amount we can invest in the wider economy, and for many they are driven into homelessness. Indeed, in 2020 the Office for National Statistics found that in London only the richest 25% of households would be able to rent a property without spending more than 30% of their income on rent. 16

Economists have developed the concept of 'misallocation' to describe a situation where resources are not being directed to their most efficient uses. Given individuals are having to spend an increasing proportion of their income on housing, every additional penny spent here is a penny not spent on areas that maximise productivity and increase economic growth. These individual mistakes compound to create a reality where growth is slower than it should be - something politicians from all major parties are now waking up to. No analyses of this problem in the United Kingdom have been conducted; however, one paper estimated that simply solving the housing crisis in just San Francisco, New York City and San Jose would see the whole US economy

14 Land Registry Data

¹⁶ ONS



¹⁰ Coelho, M; Dellepiane-Avellaneda, S; Ratnoo, V (2017) The political economy of housing in Britain. New Political Economy,

<sup>22(1).

11</sup> Hilber, C (2015) The Economic Implications of House Price Capitalisation: a synthesis. Real Estate Economics, 45(2).

12 Favara G; Imbs J (2015) Credit Supply and the Price of Housing. American Economic Review, 105(3).

13 Hilber C; Vermeulen W (2016) The Effects of Supply Constraints on House Prices in England. The Economic Journal,

¹⁵ ONS

grow 87% faster. 17 Across a 45 year period between 1964 and 2009 this would mean GDP today would be 36% higher, resulting in wages being 14% higher. 18 The United Kingdom, arguably, has a more severe housing crisis than the United States; thus, the restrictive planning system in the UK has most likely dampered income and economic growth even more than what has been seen in the United States. Given productivity growth during the 2010s only averaged 0.1% per year, housing affordability could play a huge role in solving our productivity puzzle.¹⁹

When PricedOut was founded, we aimed to campaign for housing affordability, and that is what still underlines all of our efforts. This manifesto lays out our vision of how that can be achieved. Fundamentally, we need to build more houses and the easiest way to do this is to enable more homes to be built in areas where housing is most needed - typically, the most unaffordable areas of the country. Yet we are not the first to suggest this. Previous attempts at reforming planning have failed to recognise development as a reciprocal externality problem. Any lasting reform to planning must find a way to make development work for all people; it needs to find a way to turn NIMBYs into YIMBYs.

This manifesto will therefore focus on two key questions: how do we get the public to support housing; and how do we get local authorities to support housing. By answering these two questions, we can align society's interests in developing more homes with the actual people whose veto power determines whether a new development is built. By making development work for everyone, then inevitably it will be more likely to occur and improve housing outcomes.

However, planning cannot be the only vehicle for reform. Housing supply does not just refer to the dwelling stock; it also refers to the availability of housing for new renters or buyers. This means we also need to reform the tax system to incentivise a more efficient use of the existing stock and to encourage more developments to occur. Yet none of this means we should ignore other problems haunting the housing sector and hurting residents. There already exists many rights for tenants in this country, and those are set to improve with the Renters Reform Bill currently going through Parliament; however, those rights are routinely ignored by landlords benefitting from the massive imbalance in market power over their tenants. Thus, those rights are often not enforced in practice. This applies both to those in assured shorthold tenancies and long leases. Properly improving outcomes means both recognising that the imbalances between landlord and tenant created by scarcity is the primary cause of the worst abuses in the system, and acknowledging that regulation can still play a significant role in improving outcomes and the safety of residents.

The challenge of developing a manifesto that meets the needs of all parties within the housing sector sounds an impossible task. However, it is our belief that the policies in this manifesto present a coherent blueprint for better housing outcomes and the best path we have to finally achieving housing affordability in a way that is capable of winning over the electorate. Only by doing that can a housing market that works for the British people truly be delivered.



¹⁷ Hsieh C; Moretti E (2019) Housing Constraints and Spatial Misallocation. American Economics Review, 11(2). ¹⁸ https://www.econlib.org/a-correction-on-housing-regulation/

3 ENDORSEMENTS

Britain is several decades into a housing affordability crisis. But our political system has failed to respond. The PricedOut Manifesto will kickstart our housing debate, presenting a series of substantial and realistic reforms that could help us build the houses Britain needs in a way that meets with public consent.

Ben Ansell, Professor of Comparative Democratic Institutions, University of Oxford and author of 'Why Politics Fails'

Building more homes would be the biggest and best thing the Government could do to improve people's quality of life and turbocharge our economy. We are living through a profound housing crisis - and all parties need to up their game to allow us to unlock the 300,000 homes a year which must be our ambition to tackle sky-high rents and house prices.

PricedOut have produced a manifesto which contains a blend of policies that will appeal to people across the political spectrum. Crucially, they not only address innovative policy solutions like community land auctions - they also discuss how we can change the public debate around new homes so that this stops being seen solely through the lens of NIMBY-ism and builds understanding of the real social and economic costs of our housing shortfall.

PricedOut are perhaps the single most effective, cross-party campaign group in the whole housing space, and their manifesto should trigger urgent action by anyone serious about giving younger generations a fair start in life.

Rt Hon Simon Clarke, MP for Middlesbrough South and Cleveland & Former Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities

Britain desperately needs to build more houses - and to increase public support for housebuilding. On both fronts, PricedOut have been doing invaluable work, and this manifesto is no exception. Even those who do not agree with every line should recognise it as a valuable contribution to the debate.

Robert Colville, Director of the Centre for Policy Studies

I wholeheartedly endorse this manifesto from Priced out addressing England's housing crisis. It highlights the failure to build enough homes and proposes solutions that consider both housing demand and community impact. These comprehensive proposals offer a path to a fairer housing landscape, benefiting individuals, communities, and the country as a whole.

Andrew Dixon, Chairman of Fairer Share



Housing is the most visible form of intergenerational unfairness and it should be in all generations' interests to address the housing crisis. After all, grandparents want their grandchildren safely housed, while parents want to bring up their own children in safe, secure and affordable homes. For that to happen, the nation needs to pull together and agree on solutions to a crisis that is tearing families apart. That means: building up; building out; increasing density; addressing under-occupation and encouraging downsizing; freeing up the planning process; and incentivising developers all while protecting the local environment. This is a comprehensive report that calls for just that with sensible and actionable policy reforms.

Liz Emerson - Chief Executive Officer, Intergenerational Foundation

The failure to provide sufficient high quality homes is one of the key mistakes of recent history. Too often renters are left without access to the good clean conditions, consequently both their health and finances suffer. This has been worsened by a failure to properly legislate to protect renters and provide them the access to legal aid they need to enforce their existing rights. The PricedOut Manifesto provides an exciting plan for rectifying these mistakes which, if implemented, would inevitably provide a better deal to renters across the country. I implore all legislators to take its proposals seriously, and applaud PricedOut for their work producing it.

Baroness Kennedy of Cradley, Labour Peer & Ex-Director of Generation Rent

The PricedOut Manifesto offers any policymakers concerned with the future of the country, its youth, and its shameful, disastrous productivity crunch. The manifesto uses cogent data analysis, clear policy prescriptions, and engaging historical descriptions as to how we reached this housing mess, and how to rapidly get out of it. The manifesto should be read by every politician, civil servant, think tanker, and journalist; it is truly excellent and shines a path forward.

Maxwell Marlow - Director of Research, Adam Smith Institute

The PricedOut manifesto has several exciting, pragmatic, and proven policy ideas. The manifesto strikes a solid balance between democratic placemaking and streamlining.

Martin Prince-Parrott FRSA RIBA - ESG-led Real Estate Developer

PricedOut's Manifesto – and its focus on supply-side reform - is both timely and urgent given the negative impact the unavailability of housing, its cost and its quality are having on millions of Britons. Yet building homes also involves changing the face of local communities, which is not always universally welcome, which is why PricedOut's recognition of character enhancing design codes and community land auctions are also essential. Ambitious, bold reforms are required to address housing policy failures decades in the making.

Cllr Jack Shaw, Vice-Chair of Planning, London Borough of Barking and Dagenham

An ambitious and wide-ranging attempt to knit together a variety of policy proposals



into a comprehensive solution for the housing supply crisis.

Paul Smith - Managing Director, Strategic Land Group Ltd

In the UK, we generally build between two and three homes per citizen every year. In France, it is more than five. In Austria, it is more than ten. And this is not because we have too many homes - the average person would have to spend almost a decade of their life spending everything they earn on a house to be able to afford one in this country. Clearly, something needs doing. As such, PricedOut manifesto could not come at a better time. With proposals that will both improve the supply of homes where they are needed and ensure local support, it strikes at the heart of the housing crisis.

Bartek Staniszewski - Housing & Planning Policy Researcher, Bright Blue

It is impossible to see how many tenants are competing for a home in our major cities and the resulting rise in rents, and conclude that we have built enough homes in recent decades or that the market is doing its job of allocating housing fairly. PricedOut has produced an important set of innovative recommendations for policymakers to meet this challenge and benefit both today's renters and wider communities.

Ben Twomey, Director of Generation Rent

It is excellent to see PricedOut bringing forward many of the radical ideas we need to tackle the housing crisis once and for all. For too long housing policy has contributed to our chronic lack of housing supply and the next Government must act to end this. Much of what is written here will be controversial; indeed, some of it is to me. That said I am supportive of the vast majority of proposals within the manifesto which I believe will enable more people to get on the housing ladder and achieve the dream of owning a safe and secure home of their own.

Andrew Western, Labour MP for Stretford and Urmston

The PricedOut manifesto sets out well considered evidence-led policy proposals that can make significant change to the millions of people affected by the housing crisis. These recommendations are emblematic of the pro-housing movement and would see results in housing delivery not seen in generations.


Chris Worrall - Executive Committee Member, Labour Housing Group



THE HOUSING CRISIS IN NUMBERS

I'd like to thank Sam Watling for contributing this section, as well as the Centre for Cities for providing permission to reuse graphs from their excellent paper - "The housebuilding crisis The UK's 4 million missing homes"

The post war period has seen a continuous deterioration in housebuilding rates relative to earlier historical periods according to research carried out by the Centre for Cities. As Figure One shows, house building rates in England and Wales have decreased significantly – between 1856 and 1939, an average of 1.9% of the existing stock was constructed each year, which fell to an average of 1.2% after the introduction of the Town and Country Planning Act in 1947 to 2015.



The primary driver of this fall has been a severe drop in the building rate of the private sector, thanks largely to the restrictive planning system, for which public sector construction was unable to adequately compensate for in any period after 1955. Despite higher demand from faster income and population growth coupled with the introduction of subsidies for home ownership in the 1960s, private sector building peaked in 1964 at 1.8%, significantly lower than the interwar peak of 2.8% in 1934.

This unprecedented fall in growth is also shown in comparisons with European countries both before and after the immediate post-war period. From 1955-1979, the United Kingdom as a whole experienced the lowest average private sector building rate in Europe of 0.95%. This compares to an average rate of 1.72% and 2.43% in the European country with the strongest rate of private sector building, Finland.

This underperformance continued after 1980, with Britain remaining at the bottom of European build rates due to the continued deliberate suppression of private sector building.



¹https://www.centreforcities.org/publication/the-housebuilding-crisis/

Netherlands -West Germany -Sweden -Finland -Norway -Tenure Country Switzerland -Public France -Private Denmark -Ireland -United Kingdom -Austria -Belgium -3.0

Figure 2: Average annual gross housebuilding by tenure in Europe, 1955-1979

The result of this prolonged period of underbuilding relative to both historical and international comparisons is a severe deterioration in housing outcomes relative to comparable countries in Western Europe. In 1955, the UK had a ratio of dwellings per person that was 5.5 percent above the European average, but by 1979 it was 1.8 per cent below it, and by 2015, it had fallen further to a lower bound estimate of at least 7.8 per cent below the modern average.2

Average Annual Gross Housebuilding as a Share of Housing Stock (%)

2.0

2.5

1.5

0.5

1.0




Figure 3: Average annual gross housebuilding in Europe, 1980-2015



² From 1980 onwards some European countries only release information on inhabited housing stock while the United Kingdom quotes the entire stock, including uninhabited dwellings. Therefore the European estimate for the modern era is downwardly biassed.

Using this data, the official Centre for Cities estimate suggests that, controlling for population, demolitions and the UK's initial advantage in 1955, if Britain had built at the same rate of the average western European country from 1955-2015, we would have an extra 4.3 million houses:

Country	Increase upon the UK's housing stock in 2015 (%)	Total increase in homes 1955 to 2015	Private sector contribution 1955 to 2015	Public sector contribution 1955 to 2015	Total private: public mix of gross housebuilding 1955 to 2015	Homes per thousand people – 2015			
United Kingdom	0	12,230,000	7,875,000	4,358,000	64 : 36	425			
Increase to the UK's added homes from 1955 to 2015 if the UK had built at the rate of									
Switzerland	6.0	1,647,000	6,005,000	-4,358,000	94 : 6	450			
Sweden	7.7	2,137,000	2,054,000	82,300	68 : 32	457			
Denmark	8.8	2,445,000	3,910,000	-1,465,000	77 : 23	462			
Belgium	10.1	2,795,000	7,153,000	-4,358,000	96 : 4	468			
Netherlands	10.3	2,836,000	833,800	2,002,000	59 : 41	468			
Norway	12.1	3,349,000	5,821,000	-2,472,000	84 : 16	476			
Germany	13.9	3,835,000	6,367,000	-2,533,000	85:15	484			
France	19.5	5,393,000	6,270,000	-877,700	78 : 22	507			
Austria	25.3	7,007,000	4,850,000	2,157,000	66 : 34	532			
Ireland	25.6	7,076,000	8,888,000	-1,812,000	84:16	533			
Finland	29.9	8,276,000	12,300,000	-4,019,000	94 : 6	552			
Western European Average	15.4	4,254,000	5,859,255	-1,604,855	80 : 20	490			



MAKING HOUSING JLAR WITH THE PUBLIC

To build more homes, we have to find ways to make it popular to do so. To do this, it is valuable to understand why people tend to oppose housebuilding in their areas. On a national level, people broadly do not oppose new housing. Since 2010, the British Social Attitude Survey has asked people, "How much would you support or oppose more homes being built in your local area?" 58% of people answered in 2020 that they support more housebuilding, with just 25% opposing. Of course, this could be used to explain that it is a small minority of NIMBYs who are blocking all new housing. Indeed, this is consistent with academic studies finding that homeowners are significantly more likely to oppose new housebuilding;1 they also happen to be the people who will be most directly negatively impacted by new housebuilding, since it would directly reduce to rate at which their property grows in value.2 This may explain some of the opposition to NIMBYism, but it does not paint a complete picture.

What seems to better explain opposition to new housing in one's neighbourhood is place-protection.³ This refers to the fear that new houses will change one's way of life, and the desire to preserve what one likes most about one's neighbourhoods. 4 Worries include poor aesthetics, the fear new housing will be built for outsiders and unaffordable to existing residents, the potential negative impact on local infrastructure such as parking, traffic, and access to schools and healthcare. 5 Fundamentally, many of these fears are justified and painting opposition to housebuilding as solely about one's home value is wrong. Any lasting attempt to solve the housing crisis must be done in a way that reconciles the concerns people have when it comes to new developments and find a fair way to ensure that an adequate supply of new homes are built to meet the needs of our growing population - something we have failed to do since the Second World War - whilst also not overly disrupting the quality of lives of the people who live near the developments. This section details a range of policies of how this can be done.

¹Fischel, W. A. (2001). The Homevoter Hypothesis: How Home Values Influence Local Government Taxation, School Finance, and Land-Use Policies, Harvard University Press
²Coehlo, M; Dellepiane-Avellaneda, S; Ratnoo, V. 'The political economy of housing in England' New Political Economy, 22(1); https://benansell.substack.com/p/the-uks-political-housing-crisis
³Hankinson, M. 'When do Renters Behave Like Homeowners? High Rent, Price Anxiety and NIMBYism' (2018) American

Political Science Review, 112(3).

Sterrore Review, 112(3).

Sturzaker, J. 'The Exercise of Power to Limit the Development of New Housing in the English Countryside' (2010) Environment & Planning A: Economy and Space, 42(4).

Powe, N; Hart, T. Housing development and small town residential desirability: Valued aspects, resident attitudes and growth management' (2011) The Town Planning Review, 82(3)

COMMUNITY LAND AUCTIONS

One problem many people have with development is the widely-held perception that its principal beneficiaries are big developers and landowners. To some extent, they're right - across England there is a shortage of developable land and councils tend to allocate it in large areas. These allocations will naturally be more accessible to the firms currently dominating the market, but for smaller builders, the land costs will simply be more than they can afford. Accordingly, the large developers who secure permission to build new homes and the landowners who sell them the land will earn huge profits. Meanwhile, the community will receive little to nothing of this value created. Of course, Community Infrastructure Levies and powers under section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 do provide some revenue, local infrastructure or affordable housing, but on net, the local authorities do not see a substantial share of the profits from the new development.

Community land auctions provide an innovative solution to this problem. First proposed by LSE Economist Tim Leunig, they work by a council inviting landowners to submit sealed bids of land for development. A bid includes the land the owner would sell and the price that the landowner would agree to sell it at. The council will then judge these offers and choose the most appropriate site based upon the suitability of the land and maximising the potential uplift. This structure incentivises sellers to offer plots at competitive prices, as asking too much will reduce the chance of selling the land. Chosen sites will then be auctioned to developers with the land already permissioned for the construction of new homes. Given providing planning permission typically increases land values by between 80 to 100 times more than the land would be worth without it, the plot will sell for a higher price after a second auction than what the council agreed for it, providing a source of revenue for the local authorities. This will therefore capture a larger share of the land value uplift for the community as opposed to the entirety of it going to landowners and big developers.

The policy's design means that communities will see a fairer share of the uplift, increasing the popularity of new developments and giving councils an incentive to say yes. This is because if a local resident sees a new development proposal and knows it will mean more schools, GPs, libraries, lower rates of council tax and higher investment in their areas, then they will be more likely to support it. The proceeds from these auctions could be used to fund any number of vital local services, and local leaders will be empowered to spend the income however they see fit. The result will be a new institutional design where the whole community will benefit from development.



2 LEASEHOLD REFORM

Another note of concern from new development is that new homes provides poor conditions to residents, particularly those in leasehold properties. Although leaseholders are owners, their relationship often resembles tenants as well, since they often have to pay service charges and ground rent to another party as a condition of their ownership. Moreover, the management of the shared facilities is ordinarily the responsibility of the landowner, a party who often has little financial incentive in the maintenance of the flat.

The leasehold system encompasses several inherently exploitative elements in practice. An example is Section 19 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985, which mandates that service charges be reasonable. These rights appear sound in theory, but in reality many leaseholders lack the means to pursue legal action against the management companies responsible when they fail to meet these legal obligations. This is problematic because when the responsibility for home maintenance falls upon a disinterested third party, without any legal recourse for the tenants to ensure they maintain the building properly, it often leads to negligence on their part. Consequently, leaseholders often find themselves trapped in substandard living conditions and struggle to sell their properties due to the deterioration they have suffered. By enhancing the rights and protection of leaseholders, we can address the issue of new housing failing to adequately safeguard the interests of its residents.

Commonhold offers a more efficient approach to building management by empowering leaseholders themselves with the responsibility. This is accomplished through the establishment of a commonhold association: a resident-run body tasked with maintaining the shared areas of a building. Given that residents have a greater stake in upholding high standards compared to a management company, this model ensures better accountability. Despite its potential, the commonhold scheme, introduced in 2002, has failed to gain traction. One significant obstacle lies in its limited suitability for creating mixed-use units. Fortunately, a straightforward legal amendment could address this issue by allowing different units to have distinct membership classes. This revision would greatly incentivise the development of commonholds. Additionally, amending the National Planning Policy Framework to streamline the process for commonhold developments relative to leasehold developments within local plans would further encourage their adoption.

If the barriers to commonhold development can be effectively addressed first, then the prohibition of leaseholds in new developments may be considered, but until then banning leaseholds would inevitably risk a decline in the development of common interest properties and ought to be avoided.



3 STREET VOTES & DESIGN CODES

One potentially impactful and politically workable policy the Government could pass is Street Votes. This would allow individual streets to vote upon a design code for their homes. Homeowners would then have automatic permission to develop in line with that code should they wish to do so. The beauty of Street Votes is that it is a resident-led approach that will put the interests of the community most directly impacted by the development first, encouraging house building by giving people both the tools and the reason to say yes. Street Votes would not replace the regular planning system, which would stay in place, but instead offer a route for some streets to allow building and benefit from it.

To show this policy's potential for success, an example taken from Ben Southwood and Samuel Hughes' 2021 paper on street votes could prove useful. Consider a cul-desac in London, home to 26 bungalows covering about 2500 square metres of usable floorspace. Suppose the residents agree on a street plan permitting Georgian-style basements with light wells, increasing heights to 3 storeys plus a mansard roof, whilst keeping it below a 37 degree light plane from any land not included in the Street Vote. This would increase the developable volume shape to around 21,000 square metres. Based on the expected value of these developments, if done by the residents themselves, then you would expect a total uplift of around £44,000,000. Given the development would rest upon the consent of the residents, then they would be able to negotiate for a large share of this value benefiting them directly, as well as the new residents who will move into the houses.

Clearly this example is a best case scenario, but it does say a lot about the potential of Street Votes. Even if just a small proportion of streets take advantage of these schemes, then overall housing supply could increase in a way that is consistent with the wishes of local residents. Moreover, a large part of the benefit of this policy is that it will be most successful in the suburbs of our cities. The reason this is beneficial is that encouraging densification is the most environmentally friendly way of increasing housing supply. Firstly, this means that cities do not have to expand outwardly as far, meaning that more green space can be preserved. Secondly, it reduces commuting distances so people do not have to rely on cars as much when getting to work and visiting other amenities. Moreover, denser multi-family homes require less heating to keep warm in winter, further reducing environmental harm. This, therefore, presents a scheme that will allow more homes to be built in a way consistent with the wishes of local residents and simultaneously address the causes of pollution and climate change.



GETTING LOCAL AUTHORITIES ON BOARD

Getting the public on board presents only half the problem. Even if most people are supportive of new housing, a gap between them and the decision-makers may still exist. Councils are required to keep up-to-date local plans that are compliant with national planning policies. However, many of these requirements lack teeth and there is still plenty of discretion over how a council must implement national planning policies. This process is problematic, because all governments are inevitably vulnerable to vocal minority activism. Even if the majority of residents support a development, if they do not demonstrate their support as vigorously as opponents do, then the council may be quick to prevent it from occurring. Given the need for new housing, however, this result is unsatisfactory. The government can use two main methods to stop such an outcome: carrots and sticks. Simultaneously, it must reward councils for building more homes, while also ensuring that they receive as much of the benefits from it as possible. It must also make sure that councils who fail to plan for enough homes and fail to meet targets are dissuaded from doing so. This next section will lay out our views of how that should be done.

REFORMING PLANNING OBLIGATIONS AND CIL

A concern many people have with new development is an insufficient amount of the uplift is captured by the community. There are several vehicles we currently use to do this, primarily planning obligations made under Town and Country Planning Act 1990 ('s106 agreements'), as well as the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL). These aim to ensure that councils are properly compensated for the costs they experience to ensure public services are not worsened by the additional demand that development creates.

Essentially, s106 agreements are private arrangements entered into between developers and local authorities to ensure that councils can provide the infrastructure made necessary by a development. These agreements encompass various provisions, including affordable housing, education facilities and children's play areas, among others. One major challenge is the protracted and costly nature of these negotiations, often spanning several years. Some authorities have been accused of exploiting this process to dissuade developers from constructing much-needed homes for the community. Although national policy discourages abusing this system to make development unviable, developers have exploited this to reduce affordability requirements after permission, arguing that they are excessive and make the project as a whole unviable. There is no reason to suggest they are being untruthful, but a reality of this is that there is a constant back and forth through all stages of the planning process, pushing up costs and thus making development more expensive. This prices out SME developers, helps to concentrate the industry, and increases the price of housing for all.

Community Infrastructure Levies were originally recommended as a replacement for s106 but have instead become an additional tool for local authorities to address infrastructure demands of new developments. The idea is that by allowing authorities to capture more of the planning gain, they can better plan for housing and economic growth. Furthermore, it was argued by the government that this is a fairer means of securing contributions from developers for infrastructure, since it is more certain for developers and equally applied to all schemes as opposed to varying based upon individual agreements with the developers. However, in many ways it has failed to adequately meet the needs of local authorities, and therefore fails to incentivise authorities to support new developments sufficiently.

This is because CILs have managed to become more uncertain than previously envisaged. Firstly, this is because the uptake of CIL has been poor and many local authorities have failed to use it. This means they are still using s106 arrangements much more extensively than the Government had expected. Moreover, the Government has introduced exemptions to try to encourage certain forms of development not being priced out by excessive taxation. An example of this is for the development of discounted rental properties, even when those properties are not provided by a local authority or registered private provider, or if one is building their



own home. Of course, we do not want to make these developments unviable, but national planning policy already forbids any levies that make a project unviable from occurring. Moreover, these developments, although beneficial, still place infrastructure costs on local authorities and therefore ought to contribute at least some of the uplift to compensate the authority for this. The result of these exemptions, therefore, is that less money is collected for infrastructure when the development occurs making local authorities less likely to give permission to it in the first place. For instance, many local authorities have seen their expected CIL income halve due to these exemptions according to a 2016 Government review of CIL. Clearly this situation is inadequate and in need of reform.

These two regulations act together as devices for the community to take back some of the increase in land values that occur when permission is granted. However, both of them are limited to providing ways to ensure the development does not make public services more scarce or infrastructure of a lesser quality. This is useful for some authorities, but it does not provide many of the flexibilities that they need. For example, if an authority is risking bankruptcy - as many of them are these days - they may not require new road surfaces or sewers as much as they require cash to meet their legally required bills. Even for authorities in better financial conditions, the money may still be used for infrastructure if they wish; however, it also provides them with the option to invest the money into what they need most. Indeed, it could even be used to make the land purchases required for the Community Land Auctions mentioned previously, which would, in turn, generate even more money.

The exact design of the development tax can be fleshed out at a later date, but it should at least equal the current amount raised by authorities from the existing mechanisms. A development charge of 20% of the market value of new developments when sold presents one good idea and has been advocated by Centre for Cities. It may also be a good idea to ring-fence some of the receipts generated from this charge for the provision of affordable housing to ensure local authorities do not shirk their responsibility to provide housing accessible to all people. The specifics of this plan will need to be fleshed out further, but in principle it would be valuable to switch to a model where a tax is levied on all developments providing greater certainty to developments, as well as more flexibility to local authorities over what they do with the money.



2 BRINGING DEVELOPMENT PLANS UP TO DATE

Since the introduction of modern land use regulation in England in 1947, the Development Plan has played a key role within the planning process. The plan itself represents an expression of the views of the planning authority, providing the framework within which the authority exercises its control over development. Given planning law requires that planning permission be determined in accordance with the development plan, then it is vital that local authorities have an up-to-date plan that plans for sufficient housing growth for the population. However, research from the Campaign to Protect Rural England indicates that as few as one third of local authorities have valid development plans.

Unfortunately, the consequences of not having an up to date plan under the National Planning Policy Framework are only minor. The only consequences arise from the 'tilted balance' which kicks in where there are no relevant development plan policies. The effect of this is, in theory, is that planning is tilted in favour of granting permission except where the benefits are significantly and demonstrably outweighed by the adverse effects, or where other specific policies prevent new development. However, the occurrence of other specific policies is extremely common, resulting in very little impact from the newly 'tilted' balance.

An example is York, which has not updated its development plan since 1954. Yet this area has not managed to be able to build more homes, despite the tilted balance, because of the tight green belt around the city's perimeter. It means that York cannot present an up to date development plan that meets the needs of the residents. It is therefore no surprise that since January 2004, the average house in York has increased from £146,260 to more than £325,000 today - a rate much higher than income growth.

Clearly, more needs to be done to further encourage the production of up-to-date plans; otherwise, cities with strict greenbelt restrictions have little to no actual incentive to produce an up-to-date development plan that meets the needs of its residents. One option to fix this comes from California - the Builder's Remedy. Under this policy, when an area fails to plan for enough homes, they are required by law to approve any housing project where at least 20% of homes are affordable or where 100% of them are for those on middle income. This means that provided all the housing is affordable for those earning the average salary for their neighbourhood, then the house will get built.

This law has already resulted in authorities having a greater incentive to present up to date development plans. Indeed, in Santa Monica, California, after a local developer used the Builder's Remedy to file for permission for 13 new projects, the city updated its development plans to account for substantially more housing than before.



3 CREDITS

Another effective approach to delivering new affordable homes is through low-income housing tax credits (LIHTC). Essentially, this serves as a subsidy for acquiring, constructing, and refurbishing affordable rental homes for low-income tenants. The process involves the government issuing tax credits to developers of low-income housing, who typically sell them to investors in return for a share of the profits from the development. The investors can subsequently claim the credits on their tax returns.

At its most basic level LIHTC works as follows. A developer identifies and secures a site, then creates a business plan. Qualifying locations are identified by the relevant local authority or state. The projects then demonstrate how they will provide new or rehabilitated homes at rent-controlled levels at rent levels no more than 30% of the local Area Median Income (AMI) poverty threshold.

Consider the following example: a new block of flats is proposed with construction costs of £1,000,000. Assuming a 9% tax credit rate, the development will generate a stream of tax credits equal to £90,000 (9% of £1,000,000) per year for 10 years. Because the subsidy reduces the debt needed to construct the property, the rent levels required to make the property financially viable are lower than they otherwise would be. The subsidy therefore incentivises the development of more affordable housing that otherwise may not be financially feasible or as attractive to developers relative to alternative investments.

One of the key advantages of the LIHTC is that it empowers local authorities to have control over funding allocation and ensures that development is tailored to meet local needs. Currently, when the government aims to subsidise the construction of affordable housing, they primarily distribute grants, which limit the authority of local authorities in determining how the funds are utilised, in addition to what can be achieved through s106 agreements and Community Infrastructure Levies. By transitioning to a Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) model, local councils will have a greater ability to influence the location, builders, and purpose of housing projects. This political influence can be used to generate positive reform, such as levelling up and regenerating unaffordable areas with new better quality housing suitable for the people who live there.

Since this was implemented in the United States in 1986, it has balanced the playing field, providing a large incentive to develop affordable homes, allowing investors to see it as a more profitable venture, and therefore encouraging developers to build more homes for the people who live there. This helps to increase the supply of genuinely affordable homes throughout the country. Indeed, since its creation the LIHTC programme has led to the construction of around 110,000 new affordable homes annually. We can expect similarly positive results to occur here.

¹ https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/98761/lithc_past_achievements_future_challenges_final_0.pdf



4 ESTATE REGENERATIO

This section was added after endorsers were sent the text of the manifesto. As such their comments may not apply to it.

Rebuilding large ageing estates can deliver more homes, at both social and market rents, whilst also offering existing social tenants a newer, better insulated, higher quality flat.

In the 1960s and 70s the UK built vast swathes of social housing, giving millions of people a safe and affordable place to live. Despite this being a monumental achievement, most of the new stock was built quickly and cheaply, meaning that yesterday's sanctuaries are more often than not energy inefficient, outdated homes that can be full of mould or even close to collapse.

Renovating these homes can often be prohibitively expensive and disruptive. The solution is to redevelop the estate with a mixed-tenure model funding new improved social housing and generating a net gain in housing in the area. Selling the private flats pays for the development, removing the cost to the housing association or council while often the number of social homes can be increased. The improved social homes have a huge impact on current overcrowding on the estate as households can trade up for more spacious flats with more bedrooms. The council waiting list can also be cut through the net additional gains with the building of 1 and 2 bed properties enticing older residents in other estates that have too many bedrooms to switch to smaller flats that are modern and attractive, releasing large social homes to the council.

Good estate regeneration schemes can be extremely successful and popular. In London, existing tenants must be balloted before any regeneration scheme can go ahead. The proposals consistently win with very high margins, as residents stand to benefit demonstrably from better living conditions in their new flats. Neighbours are also often in favour, as decaying estates are replaced with modern, more attractive buildings and often additional community facilities can be delivered through community infrastructure levies attached to the planning consent. The estate residents, their neighbours and the council all benefit.

PricedOut supports increasing the number of estate regeneration schemes wherever they are viable. A ballot should be required to ensure tenants are protected and any proposals are shaped by their needs. Councils should be bold in delivering plans that deliver as many new homes as possible, both social and market rent - helping to end the housing crisis and delivering safe, high quality homes to those that need it most.



WHAT ELSE IS THERE TO BE DONE

Getting both councils and individuals on board with housing reform would go a long way to solving the housing crisis, but it is not all that should be done. There are many decisions that would be hugely beneficial to increasing housing affordability across the country, and unleashing this country's productivity potential that do not directly increase the probability that councils or individuals will support new housing. This last section of this manifesto details some of those policies.

TAX REFORM

The current property taxation system in England is regressive, unfair and fails to support the supply of much-needed housing. A key culprit in this regard is stamp duty, which penalises individuals for moving house. Consequently, those on the lower end of the housing ladder face significant barriers to upward mobility, often leading to overcrowding in small flats as their families are compelled to live in cramped conditions. Conversely, families who no longer require as much space face a penalty for downsizing, restricting the availability of larger homes for those seeking to move up the ladder, resulting in under-occupied properties. By scrapping stamp duty, the UK can use its existing housing stock more efficiently. This reform has the potential to significantly increase the number of available homes, offering a partial solution without needing to lay a single brick.

The second issue lies with council tax, which, despite having minimal impact on housing affordability, is extremely regressive. Its reliance on property valuations from 1991 fails to accurately reflect current property values and results in disproportionate taxation. For instance, if you are fortunate enough to live near Crossrail, your property value would have significantly increased, but this appreciation is not adequately captured within the tax system. Furthermore, the marginal differences in tax rates across the bands are exceptionally small. As a result, individuals residing in more affordable housing will pay a higher proportion of their property's value in taxes compared to those in more expensive properties. This creates an huge imbalance and exacerbates regional inequality, as councils in London and the South East can implement lower tax rates, placing a greater burden on less affluent families residing elsewhere in the country. Consequently, they end up paying a disproportionately higher share of their wealth in taxes.

Clearly these taxes are inappropriate, yet they both need to be replaced since they bring in a significant amount of revenue for the exchequer. The best option available is the proportional property tax as advocated by the Fairer Share campaign. Under this system, individuals would contribute 0.48% of their annualised property value. This approach would yield savings for a significant portion of the population, benefiting 18 million households, which accounts for 76% of all households in England. On average, each household would save £566 per year. Additionally, research conducted by WPI Economics indicates that this tax reform would unlock 600,000 homes over the next five years, including 250,000 starter homes.² This would generate £3.27 billion in additional economic activity, ultimately benefiting everyone and improving overall wellbeing. This is also extremely popular with the public - MRP polling done by JL Partners has shown that a majority of people in every constituency support this change, with a net 35% of voters supporting moving to this system across the country.3 Moreover, numerous MPs have already backed this reform from all major parties. Moving to a proportional property tax would therefore help to increase housing supply and reduce tax burdens on the least well off all in a way that is popular amongst MPs.



²https://fairershare.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/WPI-Economics-Taxing-Time_-A-Fairer-Deal-for-Future-Generations.pdf

https://fairershare.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Fairer-Share-Polling-JL-Partners.pdf

2 GREEN BELT REFORM

The Greenbelt's origins can be traced back to a different motivation than solely preserving the scenic beauty of the English countryside. Its initial purpose was to impede the expansion of London, driven by the notion that economic growth should be directed away from the capital. Initially, the envisioned size of the Greenbelt was a mere 2-mile perimeter. However, local authorities opportunistically utilised this tool to not only curtail urban expansion but also restrict construction in proximity to several cities throughout England.

Today the legal effect of the greenbelt can be found within the National Planning Policy Framework. Effectively, this constitutes a strong presumption that anything built in these areas is inappropriate and permission ought to be denied. Indeed, some of the only developers that can occur here are infill in villages and the replacement of buildings provided they are no larger than what previously stood there. The effect of this, therefore, is that the Greenbelt is a no-go zone when it comes to development and homes will only be built there under extremely exceptional situations.

In the present day, the Greenbelt encircling London extends over 35 miles, encompassing an area three times larger than Greater London itself. This expansion poses a significant challenge by triggering a leapfrog effect, whereby individuals seeking to live in London are compelled to settle in distant commuter towns. As a result, transportation costs and burdens escalate, leaving less time for productive and social pursuits. This also means that the imposition is harmful for the environment, because it forces people to travel further for their amenities, therefore emitting



more pollution through cars. Those who don't use cars burden public transport making the experience more unpleasant for users and increasing the shortages in capacity. If we could simply allow people to live closer to where they want to travel, normally the cities where they work, then these costs would immediately reduce.

The most effective approach to simultaneously address the objective of preventing urban sprawl and facilitate the development of desirable residential areas is to strategically release sections of Greenbelt land surrounding transportation hubs. A compelling proposal by the Centre for Cities suggests the release of all green belt land that is within walking distance of an existing train station, except for where that land is also in an SSSI (Site of Special Scientific Interest) or AONB (Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty). This strategy, which would only account for 1.8% of the existing greenbelt, has the potential to accommodate the construction of up to 2.1 million homes—a number surpassing what has been achieved in the past 15 years combined. By directing Greenbelt release to these well-suited development areas and focusing on brownfield sites within the Greenbelt, we can both preserve the impetus to increase London's density and curb urban sprawl while effectively addressing the housing crisis.



3 LEGAL AID

A significant reform that we strongly advocate for to improve the housing situation for individuals is an amendment to the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. This legislation had the unintended consequence of eliminating legal aid for housing disputes. Legal aid was initially introduced as an essential pillar of the welfare state, with approximately 80% of the population qualifying for it. However, the eligibility rate has dwindled to around 20% today, leaving the majority of housing disputes ineligible for legal aid. This is because other than in exceptional circumstances such as homelessness or extremely severe disrepair, individuals on low incomes are no longer eligible for any legal aid. Consequently, if you find yourself in a situation where your landlord fails to uphold your legal rights, you are highly unlikely to qualify for state support to obtain legal representation to enforce your already existing rights.

In a previous section of the manifesto, we addressed the issue of leasehold reform. While commonhold presents a more desirable system, the main problems associated with leasehold do not stem from a lack of guaranteeing people's rights, as they often are protected. The challenge lies in the exorbitant costs involved in enforcing those rights, making it exceedingly difficult for tenants to take action against freeholders. For instance, the Homes (Fitness for Human Habitation) Act 2018 safeguards tenants against issues like dampness and provides grounds for compelling necessary repairs. However, without access to affordable legal advice, the existence of such legislative support becomes futile for affected tenants. The tragic case of Awaab Ishak, who lost his life due to inadequate housing conditions, exemplifies just one instance among many where individuals slip through the cracks of the system, denied the assistance to which they are entitled. Reintroducing legal aid for housing disputes would significantly ease the process of ensuring that such atrocities do not recur.

It is of the utmost importance that we ensure that existing renters' rights are actually enforced by reintroducing legal aid for most housing disputes for those who are unable to access good legal support. Only by doing this can we guarantee that the rights already in law are actually enforced and a better settlement for both renters and leaseholders can be obtained.



CONCLUSION

The housing crisis is the greatest challenge this country faces today. Across the country people are being priced out of the places they want to call home, being forced to live in unsuitable and over-crowded conditions and wasting the scarce budgets they have on housing costs. The reality of this is the country is failing. The UK is failing to grow: firstly, because people are misallocating their resources into housing; secondly, because firms know they can't grow here and so move elsewhere. Every time you see a horror story about extreme poverty in our own country, housing will have had a role. Many of the families forced to food banks would not be there if rent were cheaper. Those who are unable to pay their energy bills may be able to do so - if only housing were cheaper. And those forced into poverty by rising mortgage rates, might be living stable lives - if only housing were cheaper. It used to be understood that housing was the first of all the public services, an essential ingredient in creating a safe, prosperous and healthy nation. No more is that the case. The housing crisis is a failure of the British Government and of almost every Government that has preceded it since the Second World War.

The only way we can get through this crisis and provide the stable life outcomes that any developed country owes to its people is by building more houses. The problem is simple. The shortage in supply means prices are higher and consumers have less purchasing power when negotiating where they will live. Solve this, and everything downwind of it will improve.

This manifesto has sought to present a policy platform of how that could be done. Inevitably, some tough decisions will have to be made to do this and some groups will lose out. However, there are numerous ways to change the political calculus and build the homes people want in ways that will pass through Parliament. If politicians honestly engage with our proposals then the yoke of the housing crisis will immediately reduce and the success of the country will follow. Ignore the crisis, and we shall only further decline as a country and lose our place on the world stage. It is therefore essential that legislators take these proposals seriously and implement them as the first steps to a better future. Britain can be great again - if only housing were cheaper.



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